It is important, first of all, to define a fiduciary. Despite voluminous literature, there is no ready answer and the fiduciary relationship remains ‘a concept in search of a principle’. In general terms, it is possible to divide fiduciaries into two categories, status-based fiduciaries and fact-based fiduciaries.
The status-based category includes a core of well established relationships such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, director-company, principal- agent, solicitor-client, employer-employee, and partner-partner. They are relationships which are regarded by equity as fiduciary per se. It is debatable as to what is the common denominator behind these relationships but it is not a matter of concern here. Read the rest of this entry »
`It is a rule of universal application that no one having [fiduciary] duties to discharge shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has or can have a personal interest conflicting or which possibly may conflict with interests of those to whom he is bound to protect. Thus, the trustee or the manager is under a duty not to place itself in a position where there is an actual conflict of interests or where such conflict may potentially exist.
It follows from this general rule that a trustee or a manager must not enter into ’self-dealing’ transactions.” Except where market usage permits, the courts have never permitted a fiduciary, in the course of the same transaction, to approbate and reprobate on its undertaking by acting as a fiduciary on the one side, and as an undisclosed principal in its private capacity on the other. Read the rest of this entry »
The Midland Bank Trustee case therefore is a clear rejection of the wider proposition that intentional wrong, gross negligence, and fraud of a trustee cannot be excluded or modified. Before accepting this narrower formulation or the wider proposition or indeed either of the two propositions one must question the theoretical basis of each of these propositions.
It seems that even under the narrower view, an exemption clause cannot effectively exclude wilful default. Read the rest of this entry »
Secondly, the holder of a directory power is under a positive duty to initiate a decision on matters covered by the power. In making that decision, the power holder is under a duty of skill and care. A veto power, however, is a power of review that only arises when the holder of the substantive power makes a decision. From the standpoint of the substantive power holder, the seeking of consent is only a condition of an exercise of the power. As a consequence, a veto power holder is not under a primary duty to initiate a decision. For example, if the unit trust deed requires the manager to seek the consent of the trustee in any investment in a single asset that exceeds 5 per cent of the value of the portfolio, there is no dutyon the trustee to initiate the investment. The initiating obligation remains with the manager. In principle, responsibilities for decision making and for reviewing a decision are different in scope. Read the rest of this entry »
Trust cases have demonstrated that the court is very reluctant to make an agent of a trustee liable to the beneficiaries directly on the basis of constructive trust. The agent will not be liable for merely carrying out the instructions of the trustee, even when it knows that the property is trust property. There must be a want of probity on its part.” One cannot expect an agent to make detailed investigations to see whether or not its principal is validly appointed or whether or not its principal is properly exercising its power. After the decision in Royal Brunei Airlines v. Read the rest of this entry »
B. Baker v. Archer-Shee in Unit Trusts
So far, the position is this. With regard to the number of beneficiaries, the effect of Nelson v. Adamson and New Zealand Insurance Co. Ltd. v. CPD is that Baker is not limited to trusts with one beneficiary and the existence of a number of beneficiaries, whether in successionor concurrently, does not affect their respective claims to proprietary interests in the subject matter of a trust. Ironically, the expansive application of Baker was achieved in New Zealand Insurance only at the price of admitting that a beneficiary may not have a proprietary interest in the trust assets in some fixed trust situations, such as where the beneficial interest is ‘a specified sum to be provided out of an unidentified part of a body of assets‘. Read the rest of this entry »
Underlying the policy debate about merits of institutional activism is the empirical question: Does such activism have a significant impact on corporations that are the target of that activism? The short answer is that it’s unclear.
In an attempt to provide an intermediate-level answer, let us review a few points that emerge from this debate on the impact of institutional activism. To begin, the studies do not usually include proxy fights or takeover bids since these are rare events for institutional investors. In addition, these studies are all premised on the efficient markets theory, so they assume that the impact from shareholder activism can be measured by looking at a change in stock price after a specific event, such as a pension fund’s submission of a stockholder proposal.
These economic studies tend to show no or little positive price effects from proposals to change general governance procedures, such as the introduction of confidential voting or the appointment of an external board chairman (separate from the CEO). Read the rest of this entry »
The policy of most jurisdictions is to treat the mutual fund as a company subject to corporate or income tax only on its ordinary business (i.e. net income arising from holding investments), and exempt it from taxation on its gains from buying and selling investments. In the US, provided the gains and net income are distributed, the fund does not pay federal income tax on either. Taxes are the responsibility of and paid by the shareholders under a ‘pass-through’ arrangement, whether they choose to receive cash or reinvest their entitlement. Read the rest of this entry »
