The conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that the trustee and the manager are not in partnership or in a general agency relationship. They are independent contracting parties to the unit trust deed. An examination of the terms of a typical trust deed of a non-authorized unit trust in detail reveals that the majority of the provisions are covenants made by either of them with unitholders or are provisions conferring powers or discretions on them by unitholders. When the regulations of the Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991 are incorporated expressly into the trust deed of an authorized unit trust, it appears that they may be construed in the same manner. There are not many provisions that can operate as promises between these two parties.
Where provisions in the deed embody covenants made with unitholders, they can be enforced by unitholders as promisees. In respect of an exercise of power or discretion by the trustee which is without good faith or otherwise wrongful, unitholders can sue the trustee for breach of trust. In the case of the manager, unitholders may bring an action for an abuse of power on the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, there is no problem of standing to sue for aggrieved unitholders. Read the rest of this entry »
In respect of the investment of the property of the unit trust, regulation 7.02.2 spells out clearly that it is not only a duty but also ‘a right’ of the manager to make decisions. Correspondingly, regulation 7.09 is drafted in negative terms so as to leave no doubt that the trustee’s obligation does not extend to a positive consideration on the merits of particular investments. In other words, the trustee has no ‘right’ to make an investment decision as its counterpart in an ordinary private trust. This is also echoed by regulation 7.03.1 which provides that ‘Nile manager may without the specific authority of the trustee give instructions to agents as to the acquisition or disposal of property of the scheme‘. But at the same time, regulation 7.03 requires the manager to restore the trust portfolio to its status quo if the trustee forms the opinion that the manager exceeds its power in a particular transaction. Read the rest of this entry »
It cannot be denied that by entering into the trust deed, both the manager and the trustee are entering into a venture that provides services to their `customers’ and that produces their income. This is cooperation in business, but is unlikely to constitute them a partnership. Basically, the test of the existence of a partnership is by reference to the definition of a partnership discussed and also by reference to the statutory rules regarding co-ownership of assets, sharing of gross return, and also sharing of profit.
There is no business in common. The demarcation of functions under the unit trust deed draws the line of business between them. In essence, the trustee is carrying on the business as a professional trustee and the manager is carrying on the business of investment management. Read the rest of this entry »
The conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that the trustee and the manager are not in partnership or in a general agency relationship. They are independent contracting parties to the unit trust deed. An examination of the terms of a typical trust deed of a non-authorized unit trust in detail reveals that the majority of the provisions are covenants made by either of them with unitholders or are provisions conferring powers or discretions on them by unitholders. When the regulations of the Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991 are incorporated expressly into the trust deed of an authorized unit trust, it appears that they may be construed in the same manner. There are not many provisions that can operate as promises between these two parties. Read the rest of this entry »
In Parkes Management Ltd. v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. , the manager of a unit trust was aggrieved by the trustee’s issue of a certificate that it was in the interest of the unitholders that the manager should be dismissed. On the question of the manager’s locus standi, Hope JA said:
It is submitted for the Trustee that it is only a beneficiary who can challenge the exercise by a trustee of a power . . . There would appear to be three answers to this submission. Firstly, that the Manager was a beneficiary; secondly, that the provisions of cl. 20(1) of the Deed entitled the Manager to ensure that the Trustee exercised any power under the Deed bona fide without indirect motive, and with a fair consideration of the issues; and thirdly that being a party to the Deed the Manager was entitled to challenge the certificate . . . Read the rest of this entry »
In crude terms, in a unit trust, the manager performs all the functions of management of the trust assets that would have been carried out by the trustee if the trust were a private trust used as a means of disposition of properties. This leads to the question whether the manager can be considered as a trustee, by analogy to the statutory scheme contained in the Public Trustee Act 1906 that allows the simultaneous appointment of a custodian trustee and a managing trustee. A custodian trustee under this Act is one who gets in and holds the title to the trust property. The management of the trust property and the exercise of any power or discretion are vested in the managing trustee. As between the custodian trustee and the managing trustee, a custodian trustee has the custody of all securities and documents of title relating to the trust property, but the managing trustee is permitted free access to them and is entitled to take copies or extracts. A custodian has to concur in and perform all acts.’” Read the rest of this entry »
A unit trust deed typically has provisions for (a) a primary trust to the effect that whilst the unit trust is a going concern the trustee will hold the unit trust assets for the unitholders ’subject to the terms and conditions of the trust deed‘ and, in the case of an authorized unit trust, ‘all regulations made under section 81 of the Financial Services Act 1986′ and (b) a secondary trust for realization of assets and division of its proceeds upon the termination of the trust by the trustee.There is thus no question that the trustee holds the assets in the capacity as a trustee of an express trust. However, it has often been said that the trustee’s function in a unit trust is merely to hold the trust assets for the unitholders and that it does not actively manage them like ordinary trustees. The question therefore is in what character does the trustee hold assets: a custodial agent, a bare trustee or an active trustee?”‘ Read the rest of this entry »
The trust has achieved a separation of the legal and equitable ownership by imposing on the legal owner, the trustee, an obligation to hold the trust properties for the benefit of the beneficiaries. That obligation is a characteristic feature of the trust. The unit trust involves a split of that trust obligation into the custody of the trust corpus and the management of that corpus. If the trust is a manipulation of the facets of ownership’ resulting in a two-party relationship, the unit trust is a furtherance of that manipulation which results in a tripartite relationship. Read the rest of this entry »
In respect of the manager, the following functions and duties are conferred explicitly or implicitly by the statutory provisions or trust deeds:
(1) Dealer in units.
One of the attractions of a unit trust is liquidity. The manager has since the early days of the unit trust been the provider of a ready market for the acquisition and disposal of units of schemes under its management. Under the Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991, the manager must at all times during the dealing day be willing to issue units and be willing to redeem units. Similar provisions may also be found in trust deeds of non-authorized unit trusts. Read the rest of this entry »
(1) Statutory Allocation of Powers and Duties
Against this background, a structure of dual administration in the unit trust is a logical step in the functional specialization of the powers and responsibilities previously found in the single person of the trustee. The unit trust was in the forefront of this development. The first regulation of unit trusts in the United Kingdom in 1939 made the trustee-manager structure a model for the management of unit trusts. This model was adopted by many statutes of common law countries and was followed closely by unregulated schemes. Read the rest of this entry »
There is no question that the distinction between this case and those cases where the retirement of trustees was with a view to purchase is a valid one. Implicit in this judgment is the recognition that there is no absolute rule against self-dealing. The willingness of his Lordship to look at the reality is consistent with the approach of the court in Holder and the recent application of the no-conflict rule in other contexts.
If the broader approach of Holder is adopted, it must be a question of fact whether a trustee in a unit trust can purchase. The court may take into account the fact the trustee does not participate in the decision to make the sale. Read the rest of this entry »
`It is a rule of universal application that no one having [fiduciary] duties to discharge shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has or can have a personal interest conflicting or which possibly may conflict with interests of those to whom he is bound to protect. Thus, the trustee or the manager is under a duty not to place itself in a position where there is an actual conflict of interests or where such conflict may potentially exist.
It follows from this general rule that a trustee or a manager must not enter into ’self-dealing’ transactions.” Except where market usage permits, the courts have never permitted a fiduciary, in the course of the same transaction, to approbate and reprobate on its undertaking by acting as a fiduciary on the one side, and as an undisclosed principal in its private capacity on the other. Read the rest of this entry »
Under section 83 of the Financial Services Act 1986, a manager of an authorized unit trust is not permitted to engage in activities other than acting as a manager of a unit trust, an open-ended investment company, a `body corporate whose business consists of investing its funds with the aim of spreading investment risk and giving its members the benefit of the results of the management of its funds‘,” or a collective investment scheme. The Act does not restrict the activities of the trustee of a unit trust and its position is governed by equitable principles above discussed.
As noted earlier, dealing in units is the contractual right of the manager. Any gain by the manager from issuing and redeeming units is not a secret profit and therefore is not accountable to anyone. This is the position of the manager of an authorized unit trust if it discloses prominently in the scheme particulars a statement to this effect. Read the rest of this entry »
The trust in a unit trust is a trust with two limbs, a primary trust and a secondary trust. The primary trust is a trust whilst the scheme is a going concern. It may be interpreted as a trust of the Re Denley’s type or as a trust subject to the contractual provisions of the trust deed and, in the case of an authorized unit trust, the regulations made under section 81 of the Financial Services Act 1986. The secondary trustonly arises at the very moment when the trust scheme is terminated. It is a trust for sale and distribution.
The provisions to which the primary trust is subject depend on whether the unit trust is an authorized unit trust or non-authorized unit trust. The most important of these provisions will be those along the line of regulation 7.02.2 and regulation 7.09.1. Regulation 7.02.2 provides: Read the rest of this entry »
Although the manager has extensive control over the ways that the trust assets are to be invested or dealt with, it is not a trustee. This is because the title to assets does not vest in it.
The first question is whether the manager’s power is a fiduciary power or a beneficial power for its own benefit. Scott and the American Restatement draw a clear distinction between such powers in the discussion of a private trustee being subject to directory or veto powers of others. It has been questioned if such a distinction exists in English cases. Indeed, judges in early English cases did not appear to be particularly concerned with enunciating such a principle. However, there is no reason to doubt that Scott’s position represents the English position as well. The early case Discconson v. Talbot supports such a proposition. So do cases on veto powers and some cases on powers of appointment. Read the rest of this entry »
Under this rule, a fiduciary has to account for all gains obtained by reason of its position, or through an opportunity or information resulting from it.
A fiduciary may not obtain and retain secret gains. Thus, in a transaction that would be effected between a unit trust and a third party, the manager cannot interpose a nominee to deal with the trust first and arrange for this nominee to consummate the transaction with the third party at a profit. Any such profits must be accounted for. A fiduciary also cannot take any bribe or secret commission. Read the rest of this entry »
- The trustee must not follow a direction of the manager if such direction is in breach of the express provisions of the unit trust. This is so irrespective of whether the power in question is beneficial or fiduciary. If it were otherwise, the duty of supervision would be completely hollow.
In respect of every investment proposed by the manager, this means that the trustee has to check each proposal against the letter of the unit trust deed. Read the rest of this entry »
The power is to direct the investment of the capital in such investments as the testatrix’s son may from time to time direct. Upon the language of the power as a whole, in my judgment, provided he acts in good faith, [the son] is entitled to give directions to the trustees to realise any investments constituting the trust fund which they from time to time may hold. In my judgment, upon the language of the clause, the trustees are bound to comply with those directions save that they are to satisfy themselves, the shares not being shares in which there is a free and open market, that the price which they pay for them is a reasonable and proper price at the time they make the purchase. Read the rest of this entry »
Section 84 of the Financial Services Act 1984 provides:
Any provision of the trust deed of an authorised unit trust scheme shall be void in so far as it would have the effect of exempting the manager or trustee from liability for any failure to exercise due care and diligence in the discharge of his functions in respect of the scheme.
This section only applies to authorized unit trusts. Exemption clauses in non-authorized unit trusts are not affected. Read the rest of this entry »
Secondly, the holder of a directory power is under a positive duty to initiate a decision on matters covered by the power. In making that decision, the power holder is under a duty of skill and care. A veto power, however, is a power of review that only arises when the holder of the substantive power makes a decision. From the standpoint of the substantive power holder, the seeking of consent is only a condition of an exercise of the power. As a consequence, a veto power holder is not under a primary duty to initiate a decision. For example, if the unit trust deed requires the manager to seek the consent of the trustee in any investment in a single asset that exceeds 5 per cent of the value of the portfolio, there is no dutyon the trustee to initiate the investment. The initiating obligation remains with the manager. In principle, responsibilities for decision making and for reviewing a decision are different in scope. Read the rest of this entry »
