It is important, first of all, to define a fiduciary. Despite voluminous literature, there is no ready answer and the fiduciary relationship remains ‘a concept in search of a principle’. In general terms, it is possible to divide fiduciaries into two categories, status-based fiduciaries and fact-based fiduciaries.
The status-based category includes a core of well established relationships such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, director-company, principal- agent, solicitor-client, employer-employee, and partner-partner. They are relationships which are regarded by equity as fiduciary per se. It is debatable as to what is the common denominator behind these relationships but it is not a matter of concern here. Read the rest of this entry »
By now, the law must have developed a distinct body of company law. The fact that two institutions have the same origin should not per se lead to the conclusion that the same body of principles applies. Brothers, despite their common parents, are not twins automatically. Directors’ duties, despite their origin in the trust, are not trustees’ duties. Latham CJ stated that ‘the power [to alter articles] must be exercised bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole‘. Malcom CJ said: ‘It cannot be said that the alteration was made otherwise than bona fide for the benefit of the unitholders as a whole.’ The apparent similarity of these two formulations is deceptive. If the unitholders are not associating, as Smith v. Anderson has suggested, is it right to look at all unitholders as a whole? Read the rest of this entry »
Given that the primary obligation of a trustee is to hold properties belonging to others and to preserve them for the benefit of the beneficiaries, it is no surprise that trustees are generally expected ‘to use such due diligence and care as men of ordinary prudence and vigilance would use in the management of their own affairs’. When investing, they are expected ‘to take such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he were minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom he felt morally bound to provide’. This focus on integrity rather than ability ties in with the conventional wisdom that `[t]he importance of preservation of a trust fund will always outweigh success in its advancement’ . Read the rest of this entry »
As the manager is in a contractual relationship with the unitholders, it may have a contractual duty of care under the express or implied terms of the contract as contained in the unit trust deed. Historically, the court has chosen the contract as a medium of control over the conduct of people giving professional services. Invariably, the court will imply a duty of skill and care into a contract for professional services. However, as Deane J in Hawkins v. Clayton has reminded us, the preconditions for implying a term into a contract include that the term must be necessary for the efficacy of the contract, and the term must have been intended by the parties to form part of the contract. Read the rest of this entry »
In addition to the influence of dominant local shareholders, the legal relationship between a company board and its shareholders may limit the rights of the minority shareholders. In general, under U.S. state corporate law, a company’s directors owe a fiduciary duty primarily to its shareholders. By contrast, in many non-U.S. legal systems, the board may be required to consider the interests of other stakeholders in the enterprise, including the company’s labor unions and local suppliers, as well as community groups and local government.The interests of these groups may, on occasion, come into conflict with the interests of minority shareholders. Read the rest of this entry »
Luxembourg - the authority responsible for supervision and control of the financial sector in Luxembourg is the IMP - Institute Monetary Luxembourgeois - a creation of the 1983 laws to regulate Undertakings for Collective Investment, which first appeared in 1959. The subsequent Law of 30 March 1988 rendered Luxembourg the first EU Member State to incorporate the 1985 UCITS Directive into national legislation and positioned it to take advantage of the cross-border marketing opportunities available to complying funds. The law has been updated by IML Circular of 29 January 1991 and extended by further legislation - Law of 19 July 1991 - relating to UCIs for institutional investors and the Law of 8 June 1999 concerning pension funds. Read the rest of this entry »
Japan - funds analogous to investment trusts existed in Japan in 1937 in the form of investors’ associations, which, like the UK’s Foreign & Colonial Company’s original investment trust, faced challenges of legality and were dissolved in 1940, to be replaced in 1941 by undertakings that, modelled on the UK’s unit trust, found legal support. Post-war confusion led to these funds becoming closed to new investment in August 1945 and final dissolution in February 1950. Read the rest of this entry »
Spain - a new Mutual Fund Law, the ‘CIF Law‘ (35/2003), implemented the expansion of the UNITS Directive and effectively established hedge funds; prior to this, the principal legislation was the Lee de Institutions ones de Inversion Colectiva of 1984 and the Real Decorate de Instituciones de Inversion Collective of 1990, amended in February 2001. Supervisory responsibility is vested in the CNMV - Comision Nacional den Mercado de Valor’s, established by the Securities Market Law which was updated by Law 37/1998. Unusually, there are no institutional funds in Spain but this may change as CNMV’s circular of 3 May 2006 issued rules for hedge funds. Read the rest of this entry »
