The conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that the trustee and the manager are not in partnership or in a general agency relationship. They are independent contracting parties to the unit trust deed. An examination of the terms of a typical trust deed of a non-authorized unit trust in detail reveals that the majority of the provisions are covenants made by either of them with unitholders or are provisions conferring powers or discretions on them by unitholders. When the regulations of the Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991 are incorporated expressly into the trust deed of an authorized unit trust, it appears that they may be construed in the same manner. There are not many provisions that can operate as promises between these two parties.
Where provisions in the deed embody covenants made with unitholders, they can be enforced by unitholders as promisees. In respect of an exercise of power or discretion by the trustee which is without good faith or otherwise wrongful, unitholders can sue the trustee for breach of trust. In the case of the manager, unitholders may bring an action for an abuse of power on the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, there is no problem of standing to sue for aggrieved unitholders. Read the rest of this entry »
The conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that the trustee and the manager are not in partnership or in a general agency relationship. They are independent contracting parties to the unit trust deed. An examination of the terms of a typical trust deed of a non-authorized unit trust in detail reveals that the majority of the provisions are covenants made by either of them with unitholders or are provisions conferring powers or discretions on them by unitholders. When the regulations of the Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991 are incorporated expressly into the trust deed of an authorized unit trust, it appears that they may be construed in the same manner. There are not many provisions that can operate as promises between these two parties. Read the rest of this entry »
It is important, first of all, to define a fiduciary. Despite voluminous literature, there is no ready answer and the fiduciary relationship remains ‘a concept in search of a principle’. In general terms, it is possible to divide fiduciaries into two categories, status-based fiduciaries and fact-based fiduciaries.
The status-based category includes a core of well established relationships such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, director-company, principal- agent, solicitor-client, employer-employee, and partner-partner. They are relationships which are regarded by equity as fiduciary per se. It is debatable as to what is the common denominator behind these relationships but it is not a matter of concern here. Read the rest of this entry »
In Parkes Management Ltd. v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. , the manager of a unit trust was aggrieved by the trustee’s issue of a certificate that it was in the interest of the unitholders that the manager should be dismissed. On the question of the manager’s locus standi, Hope JA said:
It is submitted for the Trustee that it is only a beneficiary who can challenge the exercise by a trustee of a power . . . There would appear to be three answers to this submission. Firstly, that the Manager was a beneficiary; secondly, that the provisions of cl. 20(1) of the Deed entitled the Manager to ensure that the Trustee exercised any power under the Deed bona fide without indirect motive, and with a fair consideration of the issues; and thirdly that being a party to the Deed the Manager was entitled to challenge the certificate . . . Read the rest of this entry »
In crude terms, in a unit trust, the manager performs all the functions of management of the trust assets that would have been carried out by the trustee if the trust were a private trust used as a means of disposition of properties. This leads to the question whether the manager can be considered as a trustee, by analogy to the statutory scheme contained in the Public Trustee Act 1906 that allows the simultaneous appointment of a custodian trustee and a managing trustee. A custodian trustee under this Act is one who gets in and holds the title to the trust property. The management of the trust property and the exercise of any power or discretion are vested in the managing trustee. As between the custodian trustee and the managing trustee, a custodian trustee has the custody of all securities and documents of title relating to the trust property, but the managing trustee is permitted free access to them and is entitled to take copies or extracts. A custodian has to concur in and perform all acts.’” Read the rest of this entry »
In respect of the manager, the following functions and duties are conferred explicitly or implicitly by the statutory provisions or trust deeds:
(1) Dealer in units.
One of the attractions of a unit trust is liquidity. The manager has since the early days of the unit trust been the provider of a ready market for the acquisition and disposal of units of schemes under its management. Under the Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991, the manager must at all times during the dealing day be willing to issue units and be willing to redeem units. Similar provisions may also be found in trust deeds of non-authorized unit trusts. Read the rest of this entry »
There is no question that the distinction between this case and those cases where the retirement of trustees was with a view to purchase is a valid one. Implicit in this judgment is the recognition that there is no absolute rule against self-dealing. The willingness of his Lordship to look at the reality is consistent with the approach of the court in Holder and the recent application of the no-conflict rule in other contexts.
If the broader approach of Holder is adopted, it must be a question of fact whether a trustee in a unit trust can purchase. The court may take into account the fact the trustee does not participate in the decision to make the sale. Read the rest of this entry »
`It is a rule of universal application that no one having [fiduciary] duties to discharge shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has or can have a personal interest conflicting or which possibly may conflict with interests of those to whom he is bound to protect. Thus, the trustee or the manager is under a duty not to place itself in a position where there is an actual conflict of interests or where such conflict may potentially exist.
It follows from this general rule that a trustee or a manager must not enter into ’self-dealing’ transactions.” Except where market usage permits, the courts have never permitted a fiduciary, in the course of the same transaction, to approbate and reprobate on its undertaking by acting as a fiduciary on the one side, and as an undisclosed principal in its private capacity on the other. Read the rest of this entry »
Although the manager has extensive control over the ways that the trust assets are to be invested or dealt with, it is not a trustee. This is because the title to assets does not vest in it.
The first question is whether the manager’s power is a fiduciary power or a beneficial power for its own benefit. Scott and the American Restatement draw a clear distinction between such powers in the discussion of a private trustee being subject to directory or veto powers of others. It has been questioned if such a distinction exists in English cases. Indeed, judges in early English cases did not appear to be particularly concerned with enunciating such a principle. However, there is no reason to doubt that Scott’s position represents the English position as well. The early case Discconson v. Talbot supports such a proposition. So do cases on veto powers and some cases on powers of appointment. Read the rest of this entry »
Under this rule, a fiduciary has to account for all gains obtained by reason of its position, or through an opportunity or information resulting from it.
A fiduciary may not obtain and retain secret gains. Thus, in a transaction that would be effected between a unit trust and a third party, the manager cannot interpose a nominee to deal with the trust first and arrange for this nominee to consummate the transaction with the third party at a profit. Any such profits must be accounted for. A fiduciary also cannot take any bribe or secret commission. Read the rest of this entry »
As the manager is in a contractual relationship with the unitholders, it may have a contractual duty of care under the express or implied terms of the contract as contained in the unit trust deed. Historically, the court has chosen the contract as a medium of control over the conduct of people giving professional services. Invariably, the court will imply a duty of skill and care into a contract for professional services. However, as Deane J in Hawkins v. Clayton has reminded us, the preconditions for implying a term into a contract include that the term must be necessary for the efficacy of the contract, and the term must have been intended by the parties to form part of the contract. Read the rest of this entry »
The power is to direct the investment of the capital in such investments as the testatrix’s son may from time to time direct. Upon the language of the power as a whole, in my judgment, provided he acts in good faith, [the son] is entitled to give directions to the trustees to realise any investments constituting the trust fund which they from time to time may hold. In my judgment, upon the language of the clause, the trustees are bound to comply with those directions save that they are to satisfy themselves, the shares not being shares in which there is a free and open market, that the price which they pay for them is a reasonable and proper price at the time they make the purchase. Read the rest of this entry »
Secondly, the holder of a directory power is under a positive duty to initiate a decision on matters covered by the power. In making that decision, the power holder is under a duty of skill and care. A veto power, however, is a power of review that only arises when the holder of the substantive power makes a decision. From the standpoint of the substantive power holder, the seeking of consent is only a condition of an exercise of the power. As a consequence, a veto power holder is not under a primary duty to initiate a decision. For example, if the unit trust deed requires the manager to seek the consent of the trustee in any investment in a single asset that exceeds 5 per cent of the value of the portfolio, there is no dutyon the trustee to initiate the investment. The initiating obligation remains with the manager. In principle, responsibilities for decision making and for reviewing a decision are different in scope. Read the rest of this entry »
Under the Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991, there are many situations where the trustee has to obtain the ‘consent‘, `approval’ or ‘agreement‘ of the manager, and vice versa. There are also provisions that require a party not to act without ‘consulting’ the other party.
For example, the manager ‘may instruct’ the trustee to create and to cancel units but the trustee may refuse to follow these instructions `[w]here . . . the trustee is of the opinion that it is not in the interests of participants‘. Similarly, the trustee may refuse to comply with the manager’s instructions to create units in exchange for assets if the trustee is not satisfied that there is no ‘material prejudice to the interests of participants or potential participants’. Read the rest of this entry »
A. Delegation Without Express Provisions
The contractual nature of the unit trust means that there are matters in which the trustee and the manager have interests as contracting parties. Thus, the distinction drawn by the law between beneficial and fiduciary powers is important. In relation to beneficial powers, the trustee can delegate without express authorization in the unit trust deed. I For fiduciary powers, the trustee will be in the same position as the trustees of private trusts. Read the rest of this entry »
There are several ways in which the court may hold that delegates or agents owe duties directly to the unitholders.
In the first place, a custodian having the title of the unit trust property registered in its name is a trustee in equity. If it does not have any power to deal with the property or any other responsibility, it will be a bare trusteeof the property obliged to deal with it as the trustee or the manager may direct. Read the rest of this entry »
There are a few other sticky wickets, or Macro-Disqualifiers fund administrators must negotiate. For example, a fiduciary must’ act solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries and keep expenses to the minimum. Additionally, the fiduciary is prohibited from self-dealing, acting as a party with a competing or adverse interest in the plan, and receiving any compensation from any other party other than the plan. In other words, neither the FCM nor the trading manager should be named as a fiduciary. Both of these entities are expected to cross-trade (represent both sides of a futures trade by brokering for customers who are long and others short), work on an incentive fee basis (a conflict of interest with the pension fund), and provide a variety of services with compensation from multiple sources—all in the normal course of one business day. Read the rest of this entry »
