It is important, first of all, to define a fiduciary. Despite voluminous literature, there is no ready answer and the fiduciary relationship remains ‘a concept in search of a principle’. In general terms, it is possible to divide fiduciaries into two categories, status-based fiduciaries and fact-based fiduciaries.
The status-based category includes a core of well established relationships such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, director-company, principal- agent, solicitor-client, employer-employee, and partner-partner. They are relationships which are regarded by equity as fiduciary per se. It is debatable as to what is the common denominator behind these relationships but it is not a matter of concern here. Read the rest of this entry »
In Parkes Management Ltd. v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. , the manager of a unit trust was aggrieved by the trustee’s issue of a certificate that it was in the interest of the unitholders that the manager should be dismissed. On the question of the manager’s locus standi, Hope JA said:
It is submitted for the Trustee that it is only a beneficiary who can challenge the exercise by a trustee of a power . . . There would appear to be three answers to this submission. Firstly, that the Manager was a beneficiary; secondly, that the provisions of cl. 20(1) of the Deed entitled the Manager to ensure that the Trustee exercised any power under the Deed bona fide without indirect motive, and with a fair consideration of the issues; and thirdly that being a party to the Deed the Manager was entitled to challenge the certificate . . . Read the rest of this entry »
As the manager is in a contractual relationship with the unitholders, it may have a contractual duty of care under the express or implied terms of the contract as contained in the unit trust deed. Historically, the court has chosen the contract as a medium of control over the conduct of people giving professional services. Invariably, the court will imply a duty of skill and care into a contract for professional services. However, as Deane J in Hawkins v. Clayton has reminded us, the preconditions for implying a term into a contract include that the term must be necessary for the efficacy of the contract, and the term must have been intended by the parties to form part of the contract. Read the rest of this entry »
