The conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that the trustee and the manager are not in partnership or in a general agency relationship. They are independent contracting parties to the unit trust deed. An examination of the terms of a typical trust deed of a non-authorized unit trust in detail reveals that the majority of the provisions are covenants made by either of them with unitholders or are provisions conferring powers or discretions on them by unitholders. When the regulations of the Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991 are incorporated expressly into the trust deed of an authorized unit trust, it appears that they may be construed in the same manner. There are not many provisions that can operate as promises between these two parties.
Where provisions in the deed embody covenants made with unitholders, they can be enforced by unitholders as promisees. In respect of an exercise of power or discretion by the trustee which is without good faith or otherwise wrongful, unitholders can sue the trustee for breach of trust. In the case of the manager, unitholders may bring an action for an abuse of power on the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, there is no problem of standing to sue for aggrieved unitholders. Read the rest of this entry »
It cannot be denied that by entering into the trust deed, both the manager and the trustee are entering into a venture that provides services to their `customers’ and that produces their income. This is cooperation in business, but is unlikely to constitute them a partnership. Basically, the test of the existence of a partnership is by reference to the definition of a partnership discussed and also by reference to the statutory rules regarding co-ownership of assets, sharing of gross return, and also sharing of profit.
There is no business in common. The demarcation of functions under the unit trust deed draws the line of business between them. In essence, the trustee is carrying on the business as a professional trustee and the manager is carrying on the business of investment management. Read the rest of this entry »
The conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that the trustee and the manager are not in partnership or in a general agency relationship. They are independent contracting parties to the unit trust deed. An examination of the terms of a typical trust deed of a non-authorized unit trust in detail reveals that the majority of the provisions are covenants made by either of them with unitholders or are provisions conferring powers or discretions on them by unitholders. When the regulations of the Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991 are incorporated expressly into the trust deed of an authorized unit trust, it appears that they may be construed in the same manner. There are not many provisions that can operate as promises between these two parties. Read the rest of this entry »
In Parkes Management Ltd. v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. , the manager of a unit trust was aggrieved by the trustee’s issue of a certificate that it was in the interest of the unitholders that the manager should be dismissed. On the question of the manager’s locus standi, Hope JA said:
It is submitted for the Trustee that it is only a beneficiary who can challenge the exercise by a trustee of a power . . . There would appear to be three answers to this submission. Firstly, that the Manager was a beneficiary; secondly, that the provisions of cl. 20(1) of the Deed entitled the Manager to ensure that the Trustee exercised any power under the Deed bona fide without indirect motive, and with a fair consideration of the issues; and thirdly that being a party to the Deed the Manager was entitled to challenge the certificate . . . Read the rest of this entry »
Unitholders cannot be characterized as partners. Actions done and decisions made by them through meetings can be regarded as the acts of owners of the rights constituted by the units. They are analogous to assents by beneficiaries of trusts.
Of course, as in companies, in order for actions to be taken by a large aggregate of individuals, meetings and rules for majority decisions are necessary. Voting rights simply are parts of the rights constituting units. Once the majority in a meeting is given the power to bind the minority, there emerges the tension between voting powers as property rights and the notion of fairness in the exercise of those powers. Read the rest of this entry »
A unit trust deed typically has provisions for (a) a primary trust to the effect that whilst the unit trust is a going concern the trustee will hold the unit trust assets for the unitholders ’subject to the terms and conditions of the trust deed‘ and, in the case of an authorized unit trust, ‘all regulations made under section 81 of the Financial Services Act 1986′ and (b) a secondary trust for realization of assets and division of its proceeds upon the termination of the trust by the trustee.There is thus no question that the trustee holds the assets in the capacity as a trustee of an express trust. However, it has often been said that the trustee’s function in a unit trust is merely to hold the trust assets for the unitholders and that it does not actively manage them like ordinary trustees. The question therefore is in what character does the trustee hold assets: a custodial agent, a bare trustee or an active trustee?”‘ Read the rest of this entry »
In respect of the manager, the following functions and duties are conferred explicitly or implicitly by the statutory provisions or trust deeds:
(1) Dealer in units.
One of the attractions of a unit trust is liquidity. The manager has since the early days of the unit trust been the provider of a ready market for the acquisition and disposal of units of schemes under its management. Under the Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991, the manager must at all times during the dealing day be willing to issue units and be willing to redeem units. Similar provisions may also be found in trust deeds of non-authorized unit trusts. Read the rest of this entry »
(1) Statutory Allocation of Powers and Duties
Against this background, a structure of dual administration in the unit trust is a logical step in the functional specialization of the powers and responsibilities previously found in the single person of the trustee. The unit trust was in the forefront of this development. The first regulation of unit trusts in the United Kingdom in 1939 made the trustee-manager structure a model for the management of unit trusts. This model was adopted by many statutes of common law countries and was followed closely by unregulated schemes. Read the rest of this entry »
The trust in a unit trust is a trust with two limbs, a primary trust and a secondary trust. The primary trust is a trust whilst the scheme is a going concern. It may be interpreted as a trust of the Re Denley’s type or as a trust subject to the contractual provisions of the trust deed and, in the case of an authorized unit trust, the regulations made under section 81 of the Financial Services Act 1986. The secondary trustonly arises at the very moment when the trust scheme is terminated. It is a trust for sale and distribution.
The provisions to which the primary trust is subject depend on whether the unit trust is an authorized unit trust or non-authorized unit trust. The most important of these provisions will be those along the line of regulation 7.02.2 and regulation 7.09.1. Regulation 7.02.2 provides: Read the rest of this entry »
Given that the primary obligation of a trustee is to hold properties belonging to others and to preserve them for the benefit of the beneficiaries, it is no surprise that trustees are generally expected ‘to use such due diligence and care as men of ordinary prudence and vigilance would use in the management of their own affairs’. When investing, they are expected ‘to take such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he were minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom he felt morally bound to provide’. This focus on integrity rather than ability ties in with the conventional wisdom that `[t]he importance of preservation of a trust fund will always outweigh success in its advancement’ . Read the rest of this entry »
Although the manager has extensive control over the ways that the trust assets are to be invested or dealt with, it is not a trustee. This is because the title to assets does not vest in it.
The first question is whether the manager’s power is a fiduciary power or a beneficial power for its own benefit. Scott and the American Restatement draw a clear distinction between such powers in the discussion of a private trustee being subject to directory or veto powers of others. It has been questioned if such a distinction exists in English cases. Indeed, judges in early English cases did not appear to be particularly concerned with enunciating such a principle. However, there is no reason to doubt that Scott’s position represents the English position as well. The early case Discconson v. Talbot supports such a proposition. So do cases on veto powers and some cases on powers of appointment. Read the rest of this entry »
- The trustee must not follow a direction of the manager if such direction is in breach of the express provisions of the unit trust. This is so irrespective of whether the power in question is beneficial or fiduciary. If it were otherwise, the duty of supervision would be completely hollow.
In respect of every investment proposed by the manager, this means that the trustee has to check each proposal against the letter of the unit trust deed. Read the rest of this entry »
The power is to direct the investment of the capital in such investments as the testatrix’s son may from time to time direct. Upon the language of the power as a whole, in my judgment, provided he acts in good faith, [the son] is entitled to give directions to the trustees to realise any investments constituting the trust fund which they from time to time may hold. In my judgment, upon the language of the clause, the trustees are bound to comply with those directions save that they are to satisfy themselves, the shares not being shares in which there is a free and open market, that the price which they pay for them is a reasonable and proper price at the time they make the purchase. Read the rest of this entry »
Section 84 of the Financial Services Act 1984 provides:
Any provision of the trust deed of an authorised unit trust scheme shall be void in so far as it would have the effect of exempting the manager or trustee from liability for any failure to exercise due care and diligence in the discharge of his functions in respect of the scheme.
This section only applies to authorized unit trusts. Exemption clauses in non-authorized unit trusts are not affected. Read the rest of this entry »
Secondly, the holder of a directory power is under a positive duty to initiate a decision on matters covered by the power. In making that decision, the power holder is under a duty of skill and care. A veto power, however, is a power of review that only arises when the holder of the substantive power makes a decision. From the standpoint of the substantive power holder, the seeking of consent is only a condition of an exercise of the power. As a consequence, a veto power holder is not under a primary duty to initiate a decision. For example, if the unit trust deed requires the manager to seek the consent of the trustee in any investment in a single asset that exceeds 5 per cent of the value of the portfolio, there is no dutyon the trustee to initiate the investment. The initiating obligation remains with the manager. In principle, responsibilities for decision making and for reviewing a decision are different in scope. Read the rest of this entry »
This covers the situation where the unit trust deed directs the appointment of agents or delegates in certain circumstances and the trustee or the manager is given no discretion. In some offshore unit trusts, the appointment of a custodian or investment adviser in certain markets or abroad may be made mandatory by the trust deed. Sometimes, an investment adviser’s contract may have been entered into prior to units being offered to the public. Thus, a property manager may have been appointed for a property trust. It is also very common for advisers to be appointed for futures and options funds, country funds, and trusts of specialized sectors. Read the rest of this entry »
It is established that the powers of the manager are not delegated powers derived from the trustee; the manager is a primary source of authority, having been responsible for the set up of the unit trust. However, despite this stated position, it is submitted that the trustee has reserve powers incidental to its status as a trustee by reason of its legal ownership of the properties and equity’s imposition of duties on such an owner. The position appears to be that if the manager cannot find authority for a particular act in the express or implied powers of the unit trust deed, the manager cannot do the act. The unit trust deed is the source of the manager’s authority. Read the rest of this entry »
Shortly after Charles was decided by the High Court of Australia, another fixed investment trust was the subject of taxation proceedings. This time, it was before the Supreme Court of Canada in MNR v. TransCanada Investment Corporation Ltd. The trust was a typical fixed investment trust. Under the trust deed, an administrator (i.e. the manager) was to purchase a fixed number of predetermined shares of common stock of companies to constitute a trust unit. Upon all the shares of underlying companies of a unit being vested in the trustee, the trustee would issue shares of a trust unit. Each share of a trust unit represented an undivided equal interest in the unit. Read the rest of this entry »
B. Baker v. Archer-Shee in Unit Trusts
So far, the position is this. With regard to the number of beneficiaries, the effect of Nelson v. Adamson and New Zealand Insurance Co. Ltd. v. CPD is that Baker is not limited to trusts with one beneficiary and the existence of a number of beneficiaries, whether in successionor concurrently, does not affect their respective claims to proprietary interests in the subject matter of a trust. Ironically, the expansive application of Baker was achieved in New Zealand Insurance only at the price of admitting that a beneficiary may not have a proprietary interest in the trust assets in some fixed trust situations, such as where the beneficial interest is ‘a specified sum to be provided out of an unidentified part of a body of assets‘. Read the rest of this entry »
B. Rights in a Unit: A Preliminary Analysis and Three Propositions
A modern trust deed invariably provides that the trustee will hold the unit trust assets for the unitholders ‘on and subject to the terms and conditions of the trust deed‘ and in the case of an authorized unit trust, the regulations made under section 81 of the Financial Services Act 1986.It is always possible for the trust deed or the relevant regulations to contain hundreds of covenants or terms that may alter or add to the rights in the beneficial interests of the trust assets. With the varieties of unit trusts and the varieties of units in the market today, the significance of the qualifying statement ‘on and subject to the terms and conditions of the trust deed‘ may easily be overlooked. Read the rest of this entry »
