It is important, first of all, to define a fiduciary. Despite voluminous literature, there is no ready answer and the fiduciary relationship remains ‘a concept in search of a principle’. In general terms, it is possible to divide fiduciaries into two categories, status-based fiduciaries and fact-based fiduciaries.
The status-based category includes a core of well established relationships such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, director-company, principal- agent, solicitor-client, employer-employee, and partner-partner. They are relationships which are regarded by equity as fiduciary per se. It is debatable as to what is the common denominator behind these relationships but it is not a matter of concern here. Read the rest of this entry »
By now, the law must have developed a distinct body of company law. The fact that two institutions have the same origin should not per se lead to the conclusion that the same body of principles applies. Brothers, despite their common parents, are not twins automatically. Directors’ duties, despite their origin in the trust, are not trustees’ duties. Latham CJ stated that ‘the power [to alter articles] must be exercised bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole‘. Malcom CJ said: ‘It cannot be said that the alteration was made otherwise than bona fide for the benefit of the unitholders as a whole.’ The apparent similarity of these two formulations is deceptive. If the unitholders are not associating, as Smith v. Anderson has suggested, is it right to look at all unitholders as a whole? Read the rest of this entry »
Unitholders cannot be characterized as partners. Actions done and decisions made by them through meetings can be regarded as the acts of owners of the rights constituted by the units. They are analogous to assents by beneficiaries of trusts.
Of course, as in companies, in order for actions to be taken by a large aggregate of individuals, meetings and rules for majority decisions are necessary. Voting rights simply are parts of the rights constituting units. Once the majority in a meeting is given the power to bind the minority, there emerges the tension between voting powers as property rights and the notion of fairness in the exercise of those powers. Read the rest of this entry »
`It is a rule of universal application that no one having [fiduciary] duties to discharge shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has or can have a personal interest conflicting or which possibly may conflict with interests of those to whom he is bound to protect. Thus, the trustee or the manager is under a duty not to place itself in a position where there is an actual conflict of interests or where such conflict may potentially exist.
It follows from this general rule that a trustee or a manager must not enter into ’self-dealing’ transactions.” Except where market usage permits, the courts have never permitted a fiduciary, in the course of the same transaction, to approbate and reprobate on its undertaking by acting as a fiduciary on the one side, and as an undisclosed principal in its private capacity on the other. Read the rest of this entry »
Although the manager has extensive control over the ways that the trust assets are to be invested or dealt with, it is not a trustee. This is because the title to assets does not vest in it.
The first question is whether the manager’s power is a fiduciary power or a beneficial power for its own benefit. Scott and the American Restatement draw a clear distinction between such powers in the discussion of a private trustee being subject to directory or veto powers of others. It has been questioned if such a distinction exists in English cases. Indeed, judges in early English cases did not appear to be particularly concerned with enunciating such a principle. However, there is no reason to doubt that Scott’s position represents the English position as well. The early case Discconson v. Talbot supports such a proposition. So do cases on veto powers and some cases on powers of appointment. Read the rest of this entry »
The Midland Bank Trustee case therefore is a clear rejection of the wider proposition that intentional wrong, gross negligence, and fraud of a trustee cannot be excluded or modified. Before accepting this narrower formulation or the wider proposition or indeed either of the two propositions one must question the theoretical basis of each of these propositions.
It seems that even under the narrower view, an exemption clause cannot effectively exclude wilful default. Read the rest of this entry »
There is as yet no judicial pronouncement in England that an exculpatory clause in a trust is to be interpreted in the same manner as a contract. Instead, it has been assumed in all trusts texts that there are trust obligations which can never be excluded as a matter of law. This will be the position of a trustee of a non-authorized unit trust. A trustee of an authorized unit trust will also be subject to section 84 of the Financial Services Act 1986. Read the rest of this entry »
As the manager is in a contractual relationship with the unitholders, it may have a contractual duty of care under the express or implied terms of the contract as contained in the unit trust deed. Historically, the court has chosen the contract as a medium of control over the conduct of people giving professional services. Invariably, the court will imply a duty of skill and care into a contract for professional services. However, as Deane J in Hawkins v. Clayton has reminded us, the preconditions for implying a term into a contract include that the term must be necessary for the efficacy of the contract, and the term must have been intended by the parties to form part of the contract. Read the rest of this entry »
Secondly, the holder of a directory power is under a positive duty to initiate a decision on matters covered by the power. In making that decision, the power holder is under a duty of skill and care. A veto power, however, is a power of review that only arises when the holder of the substantive power makes a decision. From the standpoint of the substantive power holder, the seeking of consent is only a condition of an exercise of the power. As a consequence, a veto power holder is not under a primary duty to initiate a decision. For example, if the unit trust deed requires the manager to seek the consent of the trustee in any investment in a single asset that exceeds 5 per cent of the value of the portfolio, there is no dutyon the trustee to initiate the investment. The initiating obligation remains with the manager. In principle, responsibilities for decision making and for reviewing a decision are different in scope. Read the rest of this entry »
Under the Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) Regulations 1991, there are many situations where the trustee has to obtain the ‘consent‘, `approval’ or ‘agreement‘ of the manager, and vice versa. There are also provisions that require a party not to act without ‘consulting’ the other party.
For example, the manager ‘may instruct’ the trustee to create and to cancel units but the trustee may refuse to follow these instructions `[w]here . . . the trustee is of the opinion that it is not in the interests of participants‘. Similarly, the trustee may refuse to comply with the manager’s instructions to create units in exchange for assets if the trustee is not satisfied that there is no ‘material prejudice to the interests of participants or potential participants’. Read the rest of this entry »
It is established that the powers of the manager are not delegated powers derived from the trustee; the manager is a primary source of authority, having been responsible for the set up of the unit trust. However, despite this stated position, it is submitted that the trustee has reserve powers incidental to its status as a trustee by reason of its legal ownership of the properties and equity’s imposition of duties on such an owner. The position appears to be that if the manager cannot find authority for a particular act in the express or implied powers of the unit trust deed, the manager cannot do the act. The unit trust deed is the source of the manager’s authority. Read the rest of this entry »
Shortly after Charles was decided by the High Court of Australia, another fixed investment trust was the subject of taxation proceedings. This time, it was before the Supreme Court of Canada in MNR v. TransCanada Investment Corporation Ltd. The trust was a typical fixed investment trust. Under the trust deed, an administrator (i.e. the manager) was to purchase a fixed number of predetermined shares of common stock of companies to constitute a trust unit. Upon all the shares of underlying companies of a unit being vested in the trustee, the trustee would issue shares of a trust unit. Each share of a trust unit represented an undivided equal interest in the unit. Read the rest of this entry »
B. Baker v. Archer-Shee in Unit Trusts
So far, the position is this. With regard to the number of beneficiaries, the effect of Nelson v. Adamson and New Zealand Insurance Co. Ltd. v. CPD is that Baker is not limited to trusts with one beneficiary and the existence of a number of beneficiaries, whether in successionor concurrently, does not affect their respective claims to proprietary interests in the subject matter of a trust. Ironically, the expansive application of Baker was achieved in New Zealand Insurance only at the price of admitting that a beneficiary may not have a proprietary interest in the trust assets in some fixed trust situations, such as where the beneficial interest is ‘a specified sum to be provided out of an unidentified part of a body of assets‘. Read the rest of this entry »
The question before the court was the liability of the trustee to income tax on the interest. The relevant tax legislation made no provision for the deduction of tax from payments of income out of trust estates. The trustee argued, relying on Baker, that the liability to tax of income received by trustees depended upon the position as regards liability of the beneficiary; that in this case the interest received was treated as capital as a matter of ordinary principles of accounting between trustees and income- beneficiaries; that the beneficiaries would never receive the interest as income and therefore no liability to tax was possible. It was held by the Scottish Court of Session that on construction of the statute the interest was income and the trustees were the persons receiving or entitled to the income. Read the rest of this entry »
